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IV. Why did this disaster happen?

V. Lessons

It is difficult to see a case like this without wondering why such a
travesty occurred. The first possibility is ineffective assistance of
counsel. The defense attorney made no objections to the pre-sentence
report nor did he question the probation officer. He did not offer any
evidence in mitigation. 21 Another explanation is that the defense
attorney neither made objections nor presented evidence for fear of
22
breaching his plea bargain agreement.

Defense attorneys will want to be very careful in the future not to
plead guilty to capital murder without formal or strong informal assurance from a judge that the defendant will receive a sentence less than
death. Still, it should be possible to achieve the goals of a Commonwealth/Dubois agreement if the Commonwealth is firm that it is offering
23
no evidence of aggravating factors.
Summary and analysis by:
Cameron P. Turner

21 Defense counsel did raise Eighth Amendment objections in
order to preserve the Lankford issue and other federal issues. The
Supreme Court of Virginia said that these issues were defaulted because
counsel did not argue them and did not move to withdraw the plea. It
remains to be seen whether these issues were actually defaulted.
22 See Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1 (1987) (holding that the

state could seek death penalty in subsequent proceeding if the defendant
breaches the plea agreement).
23 See, e.g. Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 427 S.E.2d
411 (1993) (finding evidence of aggravating factor insufficient) and case
summary of Beavers, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.

CHABROL v. COMMONWEALTH
245 Va. 327, 427 S.E.2d 374 (1993)
MURPHY v. COMMONWEALTH
246 Va. 136, 431 S.E.2d 48 (1993)
Supreme Court of Virginia
In 1993, the Supreme Court of Virginia examined two cases and
offered guidelines about what arguments the Virginia courts will hear
after a defendant has pled guilty to capital murder. This summary will
examine each case individually and then attempt to draw broader
implications from the aggregate of the two opinions.
FACTS AND HOLDINGS
I. Chabrolv. Commonwealth
Andrew J. Chabrol and his accomplice, Stanley Berkeley, abducted
Melissa Harrington on her way to work. The victim was a married coworker of Chabrol's to whom he had previously made sexual propositions. After tying her to a bed and repeatedly sexually assaulting her,
Chabrol manually strangled Harrington, tied a rope around her neck,
wrapped her face in duct tape and enveloped her head in a plastic bag.
Medical testimony indicated that Harrington died as a result of the
strangulation and suffocation. After police arrested Chabrol for the
murder, they searched his personal belongings and found a computer
disk and diaries that contained detailed entries of Chabrol's plans to
murder Harrington. A search of Chabrol's home revealed two fivegallon containers of gasoline. Chabrol planned, according to the diary,
to use the gasoline and powdered magnesium to burn Harrington's body
at a temperature high enough to obliterate all traces of the body.
Chabrol pleaded guilty to capital murder. After the judge sentenced
him to death, the defendant elected not to exercise his appeal of right.
Virginia law, however, requires that "[a] sentence of death, upon the
judgment thereon becoming final in the circuit court, shall be reviewed
on the record by the Supreme Court." This opinion is the result of that
review. Virginia Code section 17-110.1 establishes theguidelines forthe
Supreme Court of Virginia's mandatory review of the sentence of death:

The court shall consider and determine:
1. whether the sentence of death was imposed under the
influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor;
and
2. whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.2
The court quickly dispensed with the first part of the review, stating
that they found "no indication that the trial court's decision was affected
by passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor." 3 The opinion also
noted that Chabrol made no contentions to the contrary.
The court next addressed Chabrol's argument that the evidence did
not support the trial court's vileness determination. The court first
looked to the applicable Virginia statute which states that:
[A] sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the
court.. .shall (1) after consideration of the past criminal record
of convictions of the defendant, find ...
that his conduct in
committing the offense for which he stands charged was
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it
involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery
to the victim; and (2) recommend that the penalty of death be
imposed.4

1 Va. Code Ann. § 17-110.1 (1990).
2 Va. Code Ann. § 17-110.1(C) (1990).
3 Chabrol v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 327, 334,427 S.E.2d 374,
377 (1993).
4 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2 (1990).
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The court then looked to its opinion in Smith v. Commonwealth,5
where it had elaborated upon this vileness standard:
We construe the words "depravity of mind" as used [in
Virginia Code section 19.2-264.2] to mean a degree of moral
turpitude and psychical debasement surpassing that inherent
in the definition of ordinary legal malice and premeditation.
Contextually, we construe the words "aggravated battery" to
mean a battery which, qualitatively and quantitatively, is
more culpable6than the minimum necessary to accomplish an
act of murder.
The court then determined Chabrol's actions to be vile based on the
"egregious, methodical manner in which Chabrol planned and executed
these offenses." 7 Moreover, the court found that the defendant's lack of
remorse supported the trial court's conclusion of vileness. 8 Finally, the
court held that the defendant's torture of Harrington and the agonizing
method of execution amounted to more than the minimal injury necessary to cause the victim's death. 9
Chabrol also argued that his death sentence was disproportionate to
the sentences given to others convicted of similar crimes. The Supreme
Court of Virginia found Chabrol's case to be very similar to Bunch v.
Commonwealth 10 and held that the death sentence was not excessive.1 1
For all of these reasons, the court affirmed Chabrol's death sentence.
Chabrol thereafter continued his refusal to pursue appellate review and
has been executed.
II. Murphy v. Commonwealth
Mario Murphy agreed to kill James Radcliff in a murder-for-hire
scheme. He originally agreed to perform the murder in a Virginia Beach
shopping center, but the plan went awry when the victim never arrived.
The person who hired him, Gary Hinojosa, next suggested that Murphy
fake a burglary and kill James Radcliff during the burglary. Murphy
enlisted the aid of two accomplices, Aaron Turner and James Hall, and
the three entered the apartment where James Radcliff was asleep in his
bedroom. Turner and Murphy struck the victim in the head with a metal
pipe. Murphy stabbed the victim twice with a knife and Turner tried to
slit the victim's throat. Hall continued hitting the victim with the pipe.
Murphy pled guilty to capital murder and the trial court imposed a
sentence of death. In contrast to Chabrol, Murphy chose to appeal his
sentence. Murphy contended originally that the Eighth, Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution prohibited the
imposition of a death sentence. The Supreme Court of Virginia found
that Murphy's guilty plea waived these issues and, therefore, refused to
12
hear them on appeal.
The court next examined Murphy's contention that the trial court
did not consider his mitigation evidence. The court noted the trialjudge's
statements that he had been considering the case for two months and only
needed half an hour to make his final decision. The court then cited
Corellv. Commonwealth13 for the proposition that "[t]he fact finder was
not required to give controlling effect to the mitigating evidence."' 14 For

5 219 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d 135 (1978).
6 Id. at 478, 248 S.E.2d at 149.
7 Chabrol,245 Va. at 334,427 S.E.2d at 378.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 225 Va. 423,304 S.E.2d 271, cert. denied,464 U.S. 977 (1983).
11 Chabrol,245 Va. at 336,427 S.E.2d at 379.
12 Murphy v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 136,141,431 S.E.2d 48,51
(1993).

all of these reasons, the court concluded that the trial court had properly
considered Murphy's mitigation evidence in fixing his sentence. 15
The court also held that Murphy's conduct rose to the level of
aggravated battery and that Murphy could be found to be dangerous to
others in the future. Citing the definition of aggravated battery announced in Smith,16 the court found that the evidence supported the trial
court's finding that the battery to the victim was beyond what was needed
to accomplish a homicide. Thus, the court was able to conclude that
Murphy's actions met Virginia's test for vileness. 17 Murphy contended
that his lack of a history of violence or of a felony record, along with his
remorse and cooperation with the Virginia Criminal Justice System,
undermined the trial court's finding of future dangerousness.18 The
Supreme Court of Virginia held that the "facts and circumstances
surrounding the planned murder for hire of James [Radcliff] are sufficient to support the trial court's finding of future dangerousness." 19
The court found that Murphy's punishment was not disproportionate even though his accomplices did not receive the death penalty.20 In
order to test the excessiveness of the sentence, the court looked to see if
the perpetrators of comparable crimes had received death in that jurisdiction. After examining the records of these other cases, the court
determined that Murphy's sentence was not disproportionate. The court
held that nothing in the record suggested that the trial court imposed the
sentence of death "under the influence of passion, prejudice or other
' 21
arbitrary factors.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
These cases offer insight into what the Supreme Court of Virginia
will consider following a defendant's plea of guilty to capital murder in
the Commonwealth ofVirginia. Moreover, they illustrate differences in
the appellate process available to a defendant who appeals his death
sentence and a defendant who chooses not to appeal. In Murphy, the
defendant choosing to appeal was able to assign errorto a wealth ofissues
that the defendant in Chabrolwas not.
I. Pleading Guilty
Pleading guilty to any offense obviously waives numerous potential
appellate claims. Because such pleas result in sentencing by a judge in
capital cases, a guilty plea is particularly undesirable absent a formal (or
22
strong informal) assurance that the sentence will be less than death.
Judicial sentencing presents a special danger because of the waiver of
potential issues involving communication between the trial court and the
jury.
A plea of guilty and refusal to appeal, as seen in Chabrol,waives all
defects in the trial and sentencing and leaves only the limited scope of
mandatory review prescribed by Virginia Code section 17-110. Contrary
to the Supreme Court of Virginia's holding in Murphy, however, an
admission of guilt of the offense does not admit to any more than the
elements of the offense of capital murder and does not mean that the
defendant acquiesces to any constitutional violations in the sentencing
process.

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

232 Va. 454,352 S.E.2d 352, cert. denied,482 U.S. 931 (1987).
Id. at 468-69, 352 S.E.2d at 360.
Murphy, 246 Va. at 142,431 S.E.2d at 51-52.
219 Va. at 478, 248 S.E.2d at 149.
Murphy, 246 Va. at 144,431 S.E.2d at 54.
Id. at 144,431 S.E.2d at 53.
Id. at 145,431 S.E.2d at 53.
Id. at 146, 431 S.E.2d at 53.
Id. at 147, 431 S.E.2d at 55.
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far exceeded the minimum battery necessary to accomplish an act of
murder." 27

II. Vileness Factor
Although preferably addressed on appeal rather than on mandatory
review, the issue of Virginia's application ofits "vileness" factorremains
suspect. 23 In Smith v. Commonwealth, the Virginia Supreme Court said
and
that an "aggravated battery" was a battery "which qualitatively
' 24
quantitatively, is more culpable to accomplish an act of murder.
The Murphy and Chabrolcourts' use of this definition as a narrow25
ing construction of the unconstitutionally vague statutory language
continues to be questionable. One construction might be more acceptable if the court concentrated on its interpreted requirement of a qualitatively more culpable battery rather than a purely quantitative approach. The qualitative method focuses on a heightened degree of
individual culpability involved in the manner of the killing. The
quantitative test is little more than a "one-shot, two-shot," rule that
distinguishes arbitrarily between life and death.
In both of these cases the court looked to the quantitative standard.
In Murphy, the court held "that the evidence was more than sufficient to
support the trial court's finding that Murphy had committed a battery to
the victim which was more than the minimum necessary to accomplish
the act of murder."' 26 In Chabrol,the court found that"... [s]uch conduct
22

See Dubois v. Commonwealth, 435 S.E. 2d 636 (Va. 1993) and
case summary of Dubois, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
23 See Lago, Litigating the Vileness Factor, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 24 (1991).
24 219 Va. at 478, 248 S.E.2d at 149.
25 SeeArave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 2680 (1993), and case summary
of Arave, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
26 Murphy, 246 Va. at 144, 431 S.E.2d at 52.
27 Chabrol,245 Va. at 334,427 S.E.2d at 378. The Chabrolcourt

III. Differences Between Mandatory Review and Appeal
The differences between appeal and mandatory review also suggest implications for the attorney - client relationship. Murphy was able
to bring many more issues to the attention of the Supreme Court of
Virginia than was Chabrol. Although Mr. Chabrol's attorney did
everything possible to convince his client to appeal, his failure to do so
underscores the paramount importance of developing a good relationship with the client at an early stage. The Virginia Code of Professional
Responsibility requires the attorney to accept the decision of the client
about pleas, but a close working relationship established early may help
the client accept the advice of counsel at critical points in the case. 28 As
it stands, we will never know whether Andrew Chabrol was executed
under an unconstitutional application ofVirginia's capital murder scheme.
Summary and analysis by:
Cameron P. Tumer

also found that there had been psychological and physical torture. Had
the court previously offered a definite construction of the statutory term,
"torture," so that attorneys could defend against it, it would have been
constitutionally acceptable. See Lankford v. Idaho, 111 S.Ct. 1723
(1991) and case summary of Lankford, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4,
No. 1, p. 9 (1991); andDuboisv. Commonwealth, 435 S.E. 2d 636 (Va.
1993) and case summary of Dubois, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
28 Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 7-7.

PRESENTING MITIGATION AGAINST THE CLIENT'S WISHES:
A MORAL OR PROFESSIONAL IMPERATIVE?
BY: SUSAN F. HENDERSON
I.

INTRODUCTION

The number of Virginia capital defendants who oppose presentation of evidence in mitigation or who plead guilty, or both, appears to be
increasing.1 Instances involving capital defendants who offer little or no
cooperation or who actually obstruct defense counsel in preparation and
presentation of mitigation are less visible, but probably arise even more
frequently. Examination of legal and ethical issues raised by these
situations provides another important example of why "death is different."
The trial of a capital defendant is divided into two phases. At the
first phase, a determination of guilt is made. If the defendant is found
guilty, then a second separate proceeding follows to determine the
1 See, e.g., DuBois v. Commonwealth,435 S.E. 2d 636 (Va. 1993)
and case summary ofDuBois,Capital Defense Digest, this issue; Murphy
v. Commonwealth,246 Va. 136,431 S.E.2d 48 (1993) and case summary
of Murphy, Capital Defense Digest, this issue; Chabrol v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 327, 427 S.E.2d 374 (1993) and case summary of
Chabrol, Capital Defense Digest, this issue; Davidson v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 129, 419 S.E.2d 656 (1992) and case summary of
Davidson, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 33 (1992).

sentence to be imposed. At the penalty trial, both the prosecution and the
defense may present evidence as to the propriety of the imposition of a
sentence of death. The prosecution will seek to prove and emphasize the
existence of aggravating factors justifying the imposition of the death
penalty. Conversely, the defense has the opportunity to present evidence
of mitigating circumstances to persuade the jury to impose a life
sentence.
If the defendant entered a guilty plea, the penalty phase may be the
first and only opportunity the defense will have to educate the sentencer,
whether judge or jury, about the defendant. Even if the defendant was
found guilty of capital murder after a full trial, the penalty phase will
provide the defense with an opportunity to focus the jury's attention on
the defendant solely as aperson. 2 Mitigation may include evidence about
2 Defense counsel should, however, recognize that the defendant's
demeanor during the guilt phase could adversely affect the jury's
impressions before the penalty trial begins. See, e.g., Riggins v. Nevada,
112 S. Ct. 1810, 1819-20 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing
Geimer & Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative
Factorsin Ten FloridaDeath PenaltyCases, 15 Am. J. Crim. L. 1, 5153 (1987-1988)).

